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ABSTRACT 
 
In traditional Point of Sales (POS) device, the legitimate user is mainly authenticated by PIN (Personal 
Identification Number). PIN method has drawbacks like easy to be forgotten. Fingerprint technology, 
as the most viable biometrics in the special and restricted hardware environment of POS device, has 
been used to increase user convenience. However, due to inherent problems, fingerprint alone can 
hardly replace PIN in many high secure applications. Although keystroke pattern as one kind of 
biometrics is in research for years, no real satisfied results have been got due to its inherent great 
variability. In this paper, we proposed an innovative method by adapting and increase keystroke 
pattern technology to POS device and applications. Together with fingerprint system, the adapted 
keystroke pattern recognition system constitute a multibiometric system, which helps achieve an 
increase in performance, and provide anti-spoofing measures by making it difficult for an intruder to 
spoof multiple biometric traits simultaneously. Since this approach is a combination of partially feature-
based and partially knowledge-based, it can be a more deployable alternative to strengthen existing 
PIN and pure biometric authentication methods. Experimental results support that this approach can 
be better trade-off of the security and user convenience.   
 
Keywords Biometrics, Point-Of-Sales, Keystroke pattern, Security 
 
 
1     INTRODUCTION 
 
In most of current POS (Point-of-Sales) devices, the legitimate user is mainly authenticated by two 
factors: payment card as token-based security factor, and PIN (Personal Identification Number) as 
knowledge-based security factor. After the smart or magnetic card is inserted into a POS device, for 
user verification purpose, a correct PIN is required to input from the keypad.  
 
The well-know problem of PIN authenticated method has drawbacks like easy to be forgotten. 
Biometrics technology, as feature-based authentication method, has advantages of “not being lost or 
forgotten, unique”, it can dramatically increase user convenience. Therefore it is increasingly used in 
security field. Figure 1 illustrates two samples of POS devices with/without fingerprint sensor.  
 
Compared with other biometrics like face, iris and hand geometry recognitions, fingerprint has the 
feature of convenience, proven, miniaturization and inexpensive, thus it has the best potential for 
mass-market application like in POS devices [1] to replace PIN in some authentication applications. 
However, fingerprint solely can hardly replace PIN in many high secure applications. Fingerprint has 
its own limitations. For example, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) reported 
that it is not possible to obtain a good quality fingerprint from approximately two percent of the 
population. In the fact, as analyzed in paper [2], fingerprint system solely is not quite trustable and 
exists many security risks.   
 
One solution to strengthen the security of biometric system is to build multibiometrics system. 
Multibiometric system refers to the fusion of multiple biometric indicators, e.g. detecting face, voice, 
signature together to identify a person. Multibiometric systems provide anti-spoofing measures by 
making it difficult for an intruder to spoof multiple biometric traits simultaneously. Multibiometric 
systems have been also approved to be able to help achieve an increase in performance that may not 
be possible using a single biometric indicator [3]. 
 
How to build a multibiometric system based on the limited available resources of POS device?  Prior 
researches in computer security have supported, each user has his/her unique keystroke behavior, or 
called keystroke pattern. Keystroke pattern is a biometric that identifies an individual based on their 
unique typing rhythm. Unfortunately the existing research results on keystroke pattern are not suitable 
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for payment terminal applications because of its inherent great variability. More details of keystroke 
pattern will be discussed later in Section 2.   
 
This paper proposes a novel method of adapting the keystroke pattern to POS applications. This 
approach is a hybrid of knowledge- and feature-based authentication. It increases the security but also 
user convenience. By working together with fingerprint, a keystroke pattern recognition system can be 
built based on limited resource to become a more promised method to strengthen PIN.   
 
The rest of this paper is organized as following: Section 2 is literature survey of strokes biometrics. 
How to adapt keystroke pattern into POS is studied. Section 3 presents the preliminary experimental 
system and test results. Conclusion and future worked are summarized in Section 5. 
                       
2     ADAPT KEYSTROKE PATTERN INTO POS APPLICATIONS 
 
In this section, first we conduct a quick literature survey of keystroke pattern for the verification 
applications. Latter a proposal of improvement and adaptation to payment terminal is presented.  
 
2.1 keystroke Pattern 
Keystroke pattern, is an approach as behaviour biometrics used to verify the identity of an individual 
by examining his/her keystrokes on a keyboard or keypad. The premise behind this protection layer is 
that each individual exhibits a distinctive pattern and cadence of typing. As early as 1980, researchers 
have been studying the use of habitual patterns in a users typing behaviour for identification. Gaines 
et al. investigated the possibility of using keystroke timings for authentication [4]. Later more studies 
have been done. Keystroke pattern is known with a few different names: keyboard dynamics, 
keystroke analysis, typing biometrics and typing rhythms [5, 8-11]. 
 
Most studies have used durations between keystrokes (latencies) as features for user verification, but 
some have also used keystroke durations (the time a key is held down). Used classification methods 
include traditional statistic techniques, Bayesian classifiers, neural networks and fuzzy systems. Bleha 
et al. [5] tried using a detecting the keystroke pattern of users’ “username” for user verification and 
reached FRR 8.1% and FAR 2.8%. Obaidat and B. Sadoun [6] made a comprehensive study of 
different classification methods that can be used with keystroke pattern. It was noted that keystrore 
durations gave better results than latencies between keystrokes, but using both measurements 
together gave the best results. Best results was achieved by neural methods of Fuzzy ARTMAP (a 
generalization of adaptive resonance theory networks (ART) with fuzzy set theory operations), RBFN 
(Radial Basis Function Network) and LVQ (Learning Vector Quantization). 
 
Unlike other biometric systems which may be expensive to implement, the attractive advantage of 
keystroke pattern is that it requires almost no extra hardware expense—the only hardware required is 
the keyboard. Nevertheless, user authentication through keystroke characteristics remains a difficult 
task. The reason is quite understandable: physiological features such as face, retinal and fingerprint 
patterns are strongly stable over time, unlike behavioural features such as writing and keystroke 
pattern [7]. 
 
Some conclusion can be made based on previous works. Keystroke authentication requires typing in a 
relatively long segment of text to get distinct features. For the people works daily before computer, and 
for well-known, regularly typed strings, better recognition results can be gotten. Thus currently the 
main application of keystroke pattern is proposed as an auxiliary authentication technique in computer 
network security, rather than as the normal method for user authentication. 
 
2.2 Adapt the keystroke pattern to POS application 
As illustrated in Figure 2, a high level security system needs base on “three-factors”: token-factor (e.g. 
a card), knowledge-factor (e.g. PIN) and features-factor (e.g. fingerprint, keystroke pattern).  There is 
no possible to replace one by another entirely. Theoretically, even a perfect biometrics system can 
also not completely replace the knowledge-base authentication method, e.g. PIN. 
 
POS device and its applications have specialties. First, different from computer keyboard, the keypad 
of POS device only has numerical keys (0-9) and very few command keys (Enter, Clear, Cancel). As a 
matter of fact, the layout and position of the numerical keys are strictly specified by standards (Refer to 
Figure 1). Secondly, the number of key strokes is highly limited, typically 4-6 keystrokes, which means 
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only very few features are available for keystroke pattern analysis. Thirdly, it even has higher security 
requirements because it directly deals with money. Due to the reasons given above, to apply 
authentication based on a natural (unintentional) keystroke pattern will be unfeasible in the POS 
applications. However it will be relatively easier if users want to intentionally build his/her special 
typing patterns. Such deliberated typing patterns can be more consistent and distinguishable, thanks 
to the features of POS applications, namely a simple and fixed layout and limited number of 
keystrokes. 
 
We proposed a system as illustrated in figure 3. It consisted of fingerprint and keystroke pattern 
systems. Each system generates a match similarity score for final decision. In the keystroke pattern 
system, users were asked to deliberately build a special pattern according to his/her preference, e.g. 
stop on a special key for a long time. This special typing pattern will be recorded for latter auxiliary 
authentication.   
 
The deliberately built typing patterns actually are no long purely belong to the traditional defined 
biometrics, which refer to natural features or behaviors. User must intentionally to memorize some 
special behaviour. Therefore, it is already a combination of feature-based security factor and 
knowledge-based security factor. Thanks to this hybrid feature, it offers the possibility to better replace 
the PIN method which is knowledge-base methods. 
 
To make better trade-off between security and user convenience, the new authentication procedure 
can be outlined as below: 
1).During enrolment mode, a prompt (message) which helps to memorize the keystrokes and pattern 
can be defined by user themselves.  
The prompt could have direct or indirect connections with the real keystrokes. Rather than defining a 
PIN as an arbitrary sequence, this new method allows users to input and define their authentication 
method in a more natural and memorable way.  
 
2).The prompt will be shown on the display, only after the fingerprint matching score is above       
preset threshold. Referring to the prompt, user inputs some keystrokes.     
For instance, after the fingerprint matching score exceeds 25, a prompte is showed on the terminal 
display, e.g. “1234”, the user can tying in with predefined typing pattern. Key “1”(hold 50ms)-(release 
for 80ms)-“2”(hold 60ms)-( release for 150ms)-“3”( hold 65ms)-( release for 80ms).  
Furthermore, to increase the security level again, user can input keys other than prompt messages 
(but corresponding to the enrolment template). That means, although the prompt is “1234”, user can 
input “5678” according to his knowledge of his template.  
 
3).The keystrokes and pattern will be analysed to matching the template, and generate a matching 
score. That means, even the impostor knows the keystrokes should be „1234“, due to the wrong 
typing pattern , the impostor still have difficulties to access. 
 
4).The system carries out a fusion analysis based on the keystrokes score as well as fingerprint score 
to make a decision. 
 
5).The template has self-learning function. After successful accesses, the template will be modified 
slightly to adapt some natural changes of users typing pattern.  After five failed tries, system will be 
locked.  
 
This procedure is similar to traditional PIN input thus it can be quite acceptable. Whatever, to 
remember some simple behaviours is easier than to memorize a real PIN, especially with the 
assistance of prompt message. Additionally, in case the keystroke pattern is disclosed, it can be 
updated (which normal biometrics lack this feature).  
 
 
2.3 Classification and verification  
Both keystrokes latencies and duration are acquired to build N-dimensional feature vectors for 
keystroke pattern analysis. Let R = [r1; r2; : : : ; rN] and U= [u1; u2; : : : ; uN], R represents the reference 
vectors (template) and U represents unknown feature vectors. Then the following classifiers were used 
for recognition. 
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- Euclidean distance measure  
“Similarity” is based on the Euclidean distance between the pattern vectors. Euclidean distance 
between the two N-dimensional vectors U and R, is defined as: 
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- Probability and weighted probability 
Let U and R be N-dimensional pattern vectors as defined previously. Furthermore, let each component 
of the pattern vectors be the quadruple (µi, σi, oi, xi ), representing the mean, standard deviation, 
number of occurrences, and data value for the ith feature. The score can be calculated [3] between a 
reference profile R and unknown profile U as: 
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Oui – number of occurrences of ui 
Xij(u) – value of jth occurrence of ui 
µi  –  mean of the ith of ui 
 
Since paper [7] indicated that keystroke durations gave better distinct features than latencies between 
keystrokes. Thus we gave higher weights on keystroke duration than that of keystroke latencies. In our 
experiment we assign the preliminary weight of keystroke duration 6.0=duW  and the weight of 
keystroke latency 4.0=laW . The score was calculated as (3) where 2...1
Ni = .  
 
 
])(Pr[])(Pr[),(
1
)(2
11
)(12
1
∑∑∑∑
===
−
=
−+−= i
u
ii
iu
ii
o
i r
ri
u
ij
i
i u
la
o
i r
ri
u
ij
i
i u
du uXob
O
WuXob
O
WURScore σσ    (3) 
 
 
3     PRELIMINARY EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
 
After a prototype system was built, 15 people were invited to join preliminary keystroke pattern tests. 
They were divided into two groups: group A (5 members) and group B (10 members). Group A was 
regarded as genuine user and group B was regarded as impostor.   
 
In our experiment, we only tested the extreme cases: assume impostor had already known which keys 
and the consequence need to be stroked, but the impostor didn’t know the user typing pattern. 
Meanwhile, the prompt message was identical for all users (instead of the user can define the prompt 
by themselves). A progress bar, which is controlled by 100ms timer, is shown on display as reference 
to help user manage the duration and latency time. An example is given in figure 4. 
 
During enrolment, group A members were asked to design individual tying patters but should not tell 
others. After 10 times keystrokes, a typing pattern template was build. Testing data was recorded in 
15 deferent sessions separated by at least 3 days. Each participant in each session inputs 3 times 
keystrokes as in Table 1. In group A, are used to attach others. Thus totally more than 4075 data were 
recorded. 
 
Our experiments base on the hypothesis that the impostors know the PIN. Although the results in table 
1 are not very encouraging, if the keystroke pattern is used as additional authentication method to  
PIN and fingerprint authentications, actually the system security can be improved a lot. 
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4     CONCLUSIONS UND FUTURE WORKS 
 
We proposed a novel multimodal biometric system, which integrates fingerprint and keystroke pattern 
recognitions to strengthen the PIN authentication. The new method bases on deliberately built 
keystroke pattern has hybrid knowledge-based and feature-based characteristics, thus it can better 
replace traditional PIN method and increased user convenience as well. Preliminary experimental 
results demonstrate that the verification established by such an integrated system is more reliable.  
 
To improve the performance, we work on bringing fuzzy logic into our application. Fuzzy logic offers a 
mathematical theory and logical notation to manipulate the uncertainties found in natural language and 
natural processes. Because the keystroke pattern belongs to behavior pattern and has uncertainties, 
we believe that fuzzy logic can better satisfy the requirements.  
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Figure 1:  Example of POS device from Ingenico (a) without fingerprint sensor (b) with fingerprint sensor  
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Figure 2: (a) Three factors constitute the highest level of security system: token, knowledge and feature. (b)  Deliberate 
keystroke represents a combination of feature based and knowledge-based factors 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: System structure diagram 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Example of prompt, timer bar and real keystrokes 
 
  
 
 
Total 
attempts 
Keystrokes  Feature 
Dimension 
FAR FFR 
675 222 7 3.8% 7.5% 
675 123 7 3.4% 8.2% 
675 649 7 3.9% 8.7% 
675 55555 11 3.6% 9.5% 
675 12345 11 3.2% 8.2% 
675 67853 11 2.9% 7.9% 
 
Table 1: tested keystroke and result 
 
